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Identitas politik orang Papua dianggap sebagai ras Melanesia 
dengan ciri-ciri yaitu orang yang berkulit hitam, rambut keriting 
dan beragama Kristen. Identitas politik semacam itu 
dipergunakan oleh orang-orang elit Papua sebagai alat 
perpolitikan, namun politik identitas tersebut menjadi agak 
berbahaya berkaitan dengan identitas Papua yang inklusif dan 
toleran. Pada kenyataannya, orang Papua asli dapat dibedakan 
menurut identitas agama mereka yang terdiri dari orang 
Kristen, Katolik dan Muslim. Hal tersebut menandakan bahwa 
ruang perdebatan untuk menentukan politik identitas Papua 
ditandai dengan proses negosiasi Kristen Papua (orang Papua 
yang beragama Kristen) dan Muslim Papua (orang Papua yang 
beragama Islam). Perbedaan penafsiran dari identitas Papua 
dibangun oleh para intelektual dan elit Papua yang ingin 
bersinggungan langsung dengan pengembalian identitas asli (re-
papuanization). Artikel ini akan mengarah pada metode orang 
Islam dan Kristen Papua dalam mempertahankan identitas 
mereka dan mendapatkan pengakuan sebagai bagian dari orang 
Papua. Artikel ini mencoba menjawab tiga pertanyaan terkait 
dengan (1) bagaimana Muslim Papua membangun identitas 
budaya mereka pada masa otonomi khusus; (2) bagaimana 
Muslim Papua memperjuangkan identitas budaya mereka 
bersamaan dengan Muslim imigran; dan (3) bagaimana Muslim 
Papua memperjuangkan identitas budaya mereka bersama 
dengan orang Kristen Papua.  
Kata kunci: Papua, Kristen, Muslim, Identitas. 
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Introduction 
This article is a summary of thesis research in the Department of 
Sociology, the University of Indonesia in 2008, sponsored by the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES). The topic starts by the fall of New Order 
that defining the Papuan political identity to distinguish with the 
migrants in Papua. The Papua political identity is perceived as 
Melanesian race that is black, curly, and Christian.1 Such political identity 
was exploited by Papuan elites as political instrument, but it is rather 
dangerous in developing an inclusive and tolerant Papua identity. The 
Papua ethnic groups in Fak-fak, Kaimana, Raja Ampat, Biak, Serui, and 
Sorong that are Muslim and have a long interracial marriage history will 
be excluded from the definition. The formal debate on Papua identity 
can be traced in the following case. MRP (Majelis Rakyat Papua) (Papua 
People Assembly), rejected the originality of one of the vice governor’s 
candidate in provincial governor election 2005, because one of them is a 
mixed-blood of Arab-Fak-fak.2   
The Indonesian law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy only 
explained that the native Papuan is the one coming from ethnic groups 
of Melanesian race or the migrant who being accepted and recognized by 
ethnic groups in Papua. However, in reality, the native Papuan can be 
differentiated according to their religion consist of Christian, Catholics, 
and Muslim. It implicated that debate’s arena to determine the Papua 
political identity is marked by negotiating processes between the 
Christian Papua and the Muslim Papua. The difference of interpretation 
on Papua identity is constructed by intellectual and elites of Papua that 
going hand in hand with the re-Papuanization. The borders of races, 
ethnic groups, and religions become relevant in the moment of special 
autonomy. In this context, the Muslim Papua questioned the definition 
                                                          
1 Timo Kivimaki and Rubern Thorning, “Democratization and Regional Power Sharing 
in Papua/Irian Jaya: Increased Opportunities and Decreased Motivations for Violence”, 
in Asian Survey, Vol. XLII, No. 4 (2002), 651-672; Muridan S Widjojo, “Dari Persipura 
ke Otsus: Masyarakat Sipil Papua dan Agenda Damai”, in Adriana Elisabeth (ed.), 
Agenda dan Potensi Damai di Papua (Jakarta: LIPI Press, 2005). 
2 Kompas, 19 November 2005. 
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and meaning of the native Papua that being identic with the Christian 
Melanesian ethnic groups. 
The article will concern on the strategies of the Muslim Papua to 
get into recognition in Papua in the period of Special Autonomy. This 
question leads some other inquiries on how does the Muslim Papua 
construct their cultural identity in the period of Special Autonomy; how 
does the Muslim Papua deal with their cultural identity with the migrant 
Muslim; and how does the Muslim Papua contest their cultural identity 
with Christian Papua. The term of identity refers to Bourdieu (1991) that 
identity is practical category. It is objectified mental representations 
through social practices and internalized objective cultural signs through 
symbolic manipulation strategy. Identity construction is conducted via 
symbolic and power struggle among social actors.  
The Muslim Papua is adat3 community who believe in Islam; 
meanwhile the Christian is adat community who embrace Christian and 
Catholic. Adat community, according to Law No 21/2001, is defined as 
the members of the native Papua, living in and bound to a certain area 
with high solidarity among its members. The Muslim Papua is 
represented by Papua Muslim Assembly or MMP (Majelis Muslim Papua).4 
The Christian Papua refers to Theology Institute of IS Kijne, Theology 
Institute of Walter Post, Evangelical Church of Papua (GKIT), Baptist 
church, the associations of Church in Manokwari, the associations of 
churches in Pegunungan Jayawijaya, and Bishop of Jayapura. The terms of 
Christian in Papua refers to both Christians and Catholics although there 
are many differences between them. The migrant Muslim is the people 
who was born outside Papua and believe in Islam. They are represented 
by the Islamic organizations such as MUI (Indonesian Ulama Assembly), 
Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, ICMI (Indonesia Muslim Intellectual 
association), and Yapis (Islamic Education Foundation in Papua). 
The terms of identity contestation are struggle among social 
actors or institutions in demanding their cultural identity legitimate in the 
                                                          
3 Based on Law No. 21/2001, Adat is the hereditary customs acknowledged, adhered 
to, institutionalized and maintained by the Local adat community.  
4 As a note, there are a few of migrant Muslim who occupying the first echelon in this 
organization mainly secretary general and treasury general. 
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field of identity politics. It consists of the field of Islamic organizations 
and the field of politics and religion. This research is addressed to find 
out and specifically concerning with the establishment of Papua Muslim 
Assembly on April 13, 2007. The data collection method includes 
observation, in-depth interview, and archival research. The fieldwork was 
carried out in Jayapura in the period of February 17 - April 17, 2008. 
And the resources of persons are a number of elites of Islamic 
organizations, churches, cultural communities, and local politicians. 
 
Social Context in Papua 
The name of Papua derives from word of puah-puah. It means 
curly where the modern encyclopedia of British, Dutch, and Spain took 
starting point from this meaning.5 For example, in the British-Malay 
dictionary Von De Wall, ’papoewah’ means (1) New Guinea and (2) curly 
people. The meaning of Papua etymologically can be traced in Biak 
language. FC Kamma, Dutch missionaries and historian, said that the 
people of Biak and Numfor called Raja Ampat archipelago as Sup i 
babwa' that it means as a low land or a land of the sunset.6 Idea that 
native Papua is different race with other Indonesian people and have the 
right of self-determination, stemmed from the Dutch.7 It rose in 1930 
when the great depression took place and elicited a labor competition 
between Indo-European and native Indonesian. This condition brought 
forward the significance of territorial basis for Indo-European. Then, it 
was founded new institutions and essays that Papua native are Melanesia 
race that different with other Indonesian people.8 
The population of Papua Province (minus West Papua) in 2006 
is 2.524.275 people. They embrace Christian (55%), Catholics (30%), 
                                                          
5 Sollewijn Gelpke, “On the origin of the name Papua” in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en 
Volkenkunde, No: 2, Leiden (1993). See further in www.kitlv-journals.nl/ accessed 24 
October 2007. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Arend Lijphart, “The Indonesian Image of West Irian”, in Asian Survey, Vol. 1, No. 5, 
(1961), 9-16. 
8 Octavianus Mote and Danilyn Rutherford, “From Irian Jaya to Papua: the Limit of 
Primordialism in Indonesia’s Troubled East” in Indonesia, No. 72, October (2001), 118. 
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Islam (14%), Hindu (0, 17%) and Buddhist (0, 39%). The Muslim 
population in Papua generally is the migrant coming through 
transmigration policy and spontaneous migration.9  If the migrant in 
Papua, in 1971, is 4% from total population of Papua, they become 35% 
in 2000.10 Fifteen years ago, 90% of Papua is native people. In 2003, 
cities and town in Papua are inhabited by migrant (90%) where they 
dominate the economy trade, labor, transportation, and private offices, 
and other business.11 The social and economic context in Papua 
describes that economic structure has placed native Papua in 
subordinated position and migrant in dominant position. The objective 
relations in economic structure have contributed in identity formation 
based on class that is between the native and the migrant.   
Meanwhile, social and political context is also significant in 
Papua. The debates between Indonesia and Papua nationalist about 
history of Papua integration based on Indonesia and Papua political 
identity construction.12 For Indonesia nationalist, Papua is part of 
Indonesia nation regardless races differences. Meanwhile, for Papua 
nationalist, Papua-ness based on racial differences between Indonesian 
and Papuan. According to them, Act of free choice in 1969 had been 
manipulated by national government of Indonesia through unfair 
selection of 1.025 Papua representatives. Besides that, West Papua state 
has been proclaimed since 1961. Therefore, Papua-ness is constructed 
political identity by experiences of Papua during the colonial time and 
being addressed as anti-thesis of Indonesia-ness.13 The Papuan elites 
                                                          
9 Suparto Iribaram, “Dinamika Kehidupan Umat Islam dalam Pembangunan di Papua”, 
dalam Jurnal Jabal Hikmah, Vol. 1, No. 1, (2008), 5. 
10 Rodd McGibbon, “Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy 
the Solution?”, in www.eastwest.org/ accessed on 24 October 2007. 
11 Kompas, 23 February 2003. 
12 Adriana Elisabeth (ed.), Pemetaan Peran dan Kepentingan Para Aktor Dalam Konflik di 
Papua (Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2004), 22-37; Kivimaki, Timo 
and Rubern Thorning, “Democratization and Regional Power”, 652. 
13 Richard Chauvel, “Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and 
Adaptation”, in Policy Studies East-West Center Washington, in www.east-westcenter.org./ 
accessed 24 October 2007. 
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think that the Papuan was object in the decolonization without being as 
participants.14 
The presence of Indonesia government in Papua since 1962 
raised political violence in Papua.15 The political violence is objective 
experiences being undergone by native Papua as political consequences 
of government strategy to coping with the separatism led by the Free 
Papua organization (OPM). The experiences generate collective memory 
of suffering called as “memoria Passionist”.16 Gibbons (2006) stated that 
Papua-ness became stronger in the time of New Order because of the 
development. As an instrument of modernization, economic 
development has marginalized the native Papua and benefited to the 
migrant. The special autonomy is not a way to coping with the 
separatism, but it is a result from political negotiation between Indonesia 
nationalist and Papua élites, so it represents unilateral concessions from 
Jakarta and has no relation with main political powers advocating Papua 
independence such as Free Papua organization and Papua presidium 
Council (PDP).17 Related with the political context, this study assumes 
that migrant political orientation tends to the Indonesian nationalist and 
Papuan native tends to Papua nationalist.  
Moreover, economy and political context, cultural context is 
important to find out. Interviews data shows that native Papua still 
embraces Melanesian’s system of belief due to the Christian and Islam 
only grow to be ‘a family religion’.18 It still exists in the modern everyday 
life of Christian Papua and Muslim Papua as customs and cultural 
traditions.  Whiteman explained that the most central value for culture 
and religion of Melanesia is a continuity of life, preservation of life, 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 82. 
15 Adriana Elisabeth (eds.), Pemetaan Peran, 38. 
16 Benny Giay, Misi Gereja dan Budaya Kekerasan di Tanah Papua, Hidup dan Karya Pdt 
Herman Saud Ketua Sinode GKI di Tanah Papua Masa Bakti 1996-2005 (Jayapura: Deiyai, 
2006), 6. 
17 Rodd McGibbon, “Secessionist Challenges”, viii. 
18 Jose Mansoben, interview, Jayapura, March 4th, 2008; JF Onim, interview, Jayapura, April 
7th, 2008.  
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protection of life, and celebration of life.19 It turns into sources of values 
that can bring together Papua people that embrace Christian or Islam. In 
the colonial time, inter-religion differences were not significant. 
Although there are many religions in Fak-fak and Kaimana, the native 
Papua is bounded with cultural tradition and kinship. It supported their 
modern religion practices develop into more tolerant, open, and 
moderate. It is identified as habitus of religion of the native Papua.  
The Christian came into Papua through Manokwari when two 
German missionaries C.W. Attouw and G.J. Geissler harbored in 
Mansinam Island on February 5, 1855. Catholic cross the threshold to 
Papua in 1896 in Merauke, but missionary activities was started on in 
1902 under Ordo of Pure Heart (MSC) and Ordo of Dina Sister 
(OFM).20 According to Mansoben, the attendance of Christian in Papua 
purpose as unites Melanesian tribes into one common community. 
Thomas Arnold said that amount of Papua tribes in GebiIsland has been 
Islamized by Moluccas migrant since 1606.21 The Spaniard sailor, Louis 
Vaes de Torres, found Muslim traders from Ternate, Tidore and 
Makassar that preaching Islam in Onim Fak-fak.22 The sultanate of 
Bacan in Northern Moluccas has occupied western Papua such as 
Waigeo, Misool, Waigama, and Salawati since the16th century. FC 
Kamma (1981: 61) also said that in 1500, the Papua people on western 
and northern coastal lost their sovereignty since Sultan Tidore appointed 
the deputies to collect tributary like slaves and Cenderawasih bird.23 Islam 
is recognized as the first religion came in Papua but their roles are very 
limited in developing of civilization due to Islam was developed by 
personal relations. 
                                                          
19 Agus Alua, Papua Barat Dari Pangkuan Ke Pangkuan, Suatu Ikhtisar Kronologis: Seri 
Pendidikan Politik Papua No. 2, (Jayapura: STFT Fajar Timur, 2006), 14. 
20 Bondan Soedarto, Sejarah Perjuangan Rakyat Irian Barat, (Jayapura: Uncend and 
Bappeda Provinsi Irian Jaya, 1989), 53-61. 
21 Ali Athwa, Islam atau Kristenkah Agama Orang Irian? (Jakarta: Pustaka Da’i, 2004), 44. 
22 Bondan Soedarto, Sejarah Perjuangan, 57. 
23 F. C. Kamma, Ajaib di Mata Kita Jilid I (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1981), 61. 
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Refer to Bourdieu, Papua is a social space; consist of a variety of 
fields.24 The field of politics since colonial time until nowadays has 
shaped the Papua political identity. Before colonialism, the tribe’s 
identity turns out to be the dominant identity. The special autonomy is 
political affirmation for the native Papua to go into the field of politics. 
However, the field of identity politics in Papua are lived in by Muslim 
Papua, Muslim migrant, Christian Papua, and Christian migrant. The 
study only focuses on how the Muslim Papua, between Muslim and 
Christian Papua, creates their cultural identity in the field of identity 
politics. The next part will explain how the Muslim Papua constructs 
their identity through political discourse and establishment of Papua 
Muslim Assembly. 
 
Identity Construction of the Muslim Papua 
The Muslim Papua is symbolized by Papua Muslim Assembly 
(Majelis Muslim Papua (MMP)), that is a continuity from Papua Muslim 
Solidarity (Solidaritas Muslim Papua (SMP)) founded by 47 Muslim elites in 
Papua on November 21, 1999 such as Thaha M. Alhamid, Aroby A. 
Aituarouw, L. Anum Siregar, and Sayyid Fadhal Alhamid. SMP is one of 
the ways of Muslim Papua in building their identity in Papua. While the 
Christian Papua was successful in developing Papua nationalism that 
equal with Indonesia nationalism, the Muslim Papua was conscious of 
their position in the contestation of political identity between Indonesia-
ness and Papua-ness. The establishment of SMP could not be separated 
from the political context of the awakening of the native Papua in 1999. 
A few of months before the formation of SMP, exactly in February 26, 
1999, 100 Papuan elites took on national dialogue with President BJ 
Habibie and express political declaration that they wanted to go out from 
Indonesia.25 
                                                          
24 Bourdieu, Pierre, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino 
Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 9. 
25 Agus Alua, Dialog Nasional Papua dan Indonesia 26 Februari 1999: Seri Pendidikan Politik 
Papua No. 2, (Jayapura: STFT Fajar Timur, 2002), 10. 
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The political tension in Papua in 1999 also came across with the 
formation of dominant political discourse in mass media that Islam was 
one and identical with Indonesia, military, and migrant. Meanwhile, 
Papua is matching with Christian, Melanesian race, and separatist. 
According to L. Anum Siregar, Secretary General of MMP and 
chairperson of ALDP (Alliance of Democracy for Papua), it was 
constructed for the reason that encountering experiences between Papua 
native and Indonesian people through annexation, transmigration, and 
military operation. It was reinforced by NGOs and churches opinion 
that the identification of the native Papua as Melanesian, Christian, and 
separatist rooted in political violence in Pegunungan Tengah where the 
region was occupied by military operation.  
The rationale of establishment of MMP is as follow. The first is 
to counter discourse against the dominant political identity discourse that 
Islam is identical with Indonesia. The term of Muslim Papua is closer 
with the native Papua because in reality, not all Muslims are in the side of 
Indonesia and not all of native Papua are Christian. The second is as 
communication’s bridge between Muslim migrant with Christian Papua 
society. It provides evidence that social construction of identity about 
Indonesia is Islam and Papua-Christian is not right. The third is that 
MMP is dealing with the recognition of the native Papua. It implicates 
for rights and liabilities inherited by the native Papua native including 
tribes’ territory (tanah adat) or the right over certain territory. The fourth, 
MMP is a form of critique against Islamic organizations mainly MUI 
which tends to empower of Muslim migrant and has not root in Muslim 
Papua communities. The fifth, MMP is an Islamic based institution for 
advocating human rights and economic disparity between the native 
Papua and the migrant. 
Theological construction of MMP is not different with other 
Islamic organizations that every Muslim should be rahmatan lil ‘alamin 
(blessing for all universes). On individual level, the vision developed is 
increasing goodness and struggling for people welfare in Papua. In its 
declaration, MMP convey messages to the non-Muslim communities as 
follow: (1) MMP does not want to create an exclusive community; (2) 
MMP does not put into practice of Islamization; (3) MMP does not 
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extend a religion fundamentalism. The roles, which will be taken by 
MMP, are cooperation with government to insist on justice and people 
welfare, and collaboration with leader of church in composing Papua as 
peace land. The objectives of MMP as follow. The first, to make 
structure of society and human solidarity among all Muslim in everyday 
life, based on basic principles of Islam blessing for all universes and for 
religion tolerance. The second is putting together Muslim welfare 
through advance of education and health services, economic 
independence, and environment preservation, social, culture 
emancipation, and human rights enforcement. 
The term of Muslim Papua is a politically construction. It comes 
into sight to differentiate with migrant Muslim. Differences between the 
Muslim Papua and Muslim migrant does not seem apparently in Fak-fak 
and Kaimana, but look predominant in other regencies and cities of 
Papua mainly in Jayapura. In this perspective, The Muslim Papua means 
as Muslim that does not create cultural distances with the native Papua 
who majority are Christian. It is often expressed as religion habitus of 
Muslim Papua i.e. moderate, open, tolerant, inclusive, and put emphasis 
on dialogue. The Muslim Papua regards their culture as a 
communication’s tool among Papuan people and do not put religion as 
difference in everyday life. Islam for Muslim Papua brings together with 
culture of the native Papua. This vision of Islam like this can be found in 
social practices of MMP that stating Merry Christmas with Christian 
communities in December 25, 2007.  
MMP is also identical with icon of human rights struggling over 
the native Papua due to a main part of central committee of MMP are 
dwelled in by activist from ALDP (Democracy Alliance for Papua), an 
NGO that advocate human rights centered on Jayapura. Refers to 
Bourdieu, advocating of human rights can be categorized as social 
practices of MMP. Starting from these social practices, political habitus 
of MMP can be categorized as criticize, anti-status quo, and anti-
violence. From the kinds of capital, two most significant are social and 
symbolic capital. The first, MMP has strong relation with Christian 
organizations and NGOs in Papua. Even, the founder of MMP, Thaha 
M. Alhamid is secretary general of Papua Presidium Council (PDP), an 
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institution of Papua political independence movement. It has made 
MMP more being accepted in Christian Papua communities than Islamic 
organizations. The second is recognition that basis and members of 
MMP is the native Papua from seven cultural territories in Papua.  
The establishment of MMP can be interpreted as an effort of the 
Muslim Papua to put up their dream in the future by looking back their 
history. For a community in subordinated position such as MMP, history 
is a foundation to search their identity against the legitimate definition of 
identity constructed by the dominant group. The interpretation over 
history by the dominant groups has function as legitimating instrument 
over domination relations. Sociologically, MMP represents Muslim 
Papua that being in subordinated position to get recognition of their 
cultural identity. By means of Bourdieu perspectives, the founding of 
MMP can be read between the lines as creation of symbolic capital. It is 
defined as a set of respect owned by a social actor so associate on his 
positions in social structure that is recognized as legitimate. The 
acknowledgment of Muslim Papua as the Papua native is understood as 
recognition over the rights of the Muslim Papua to have roles in Papua 
as the Christian Papua. Nevertheless, the problem is the identity 
discourse of the Muslim will deal with the dominant identity discourse of 
Muslim migrant and Christian Papua. The following section will shed a 
light how the Papua-Muslim contest their identity against the Muslim 
migrant. 
 
Muslim Papua and Muslim Migrant 
The field of Islamic organization is a contest between migrant 
based Islamic organizations and MMP in performing religious social 
practices and defining Islam-ness way of life that being recognized as 
legitimate in Papua. The migrant based Islamic organizations are MUI 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia), Yapis (Yayasan Pendidikan Islam di Tanah Papua), 
Muhammadiyah, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Indonesia), Hidayatullah, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), Assalam, 
LDII (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia), and BKPRMI (Badan Koordinasi 
Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Indonesia). On the other hand, the significant 
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Islamic organizations in this field are MUI, Muhammadiyah, Yapis, NU, 
and ICMI. MUI is an Islamic institution that being acknowledged by the 
national government as represents Islamic people, whereas Yapis is 
accepted by local government in their working for education in Papua. 
However, Muhammadiyah and NU are accredited due to their longer 
time presence in Papua since early integration. ICMI is renowned 
because their chairperson, Musa’ad was one of actors in negotiating 
special autonomy of Papua. If being observed from their political 
habitus, Islamic organizations have many similarities i.e. not critical and 
pro-status quo. Their religion social practices are education, development 
of cooperation, spread of Islamic thought and Indonesia political 
orientation, and wearing Islamic symbols. They are influenced by their 
political habitus and their capital (material, cultural, social, and symbolic), 
their interest to maintain Indonesia as a political unitary, and the field of 
Islamic organizations that put them in a dominant position put side by 
side with MMP.  
MMP has dissimilar habitus that are criticizing, anti-status quo, 
and anti-violence that stand for sustaining Papua as land of peace. Social 
practices from MMP individuals, such as advocating of human rights and 
taking part in political movement of Papua people such as PDP and 
DAP, are influenced by their political habitus and the field of Islamic 
organizations that situate them in subordinated position. The marginal 
position of MMP in this field is due to they are minus in all kind of 
capital. Since the field of Islamic organizations is within the field of 
politics, so the latter influences the former. Consequently, the objective 
relations between Islamic organizations and MMP correspond to the 
objective relations between Indonesia and Papua nationalist. 
One way to get across identity contestation among MMP and 
Islamic organizations in the field of Islamic organizations is uttering 
Merry Christmas to the Papua-Christian. Saying Merry Christmas is 
prohibited for the reason that it recognizes indirectly the other God 
except Allah. Therefore, not all of the Islamic organizations ever say 
Merry Christmas to the Christian. MUI, under Buya Hamka in 1974, has 
declared as forbidden statements for Islamic organization to saying 
Merry Christmas since it is indistinguishable with celebration of God’s 
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birthday. Nonetheless, MMP has a different principle that saying Merry 
Christmas can be justified for Islamic communities in Papua as 
expression of culture and it also has become cultural tradition for both 
Papua-Muslim and Papua-Christian. The action of MMP to fix banner 
about Merry Christmas on December 25, 2007 is inseparable part from 
culture of the native Papua. The message of this banner is that MMP 
expressed their difference with their counterpart, the Muslim migrant. 
In addition, if being analyzed from the discourse of Islam-ness, 
almost of Islamic organizations has set up from the view of Al Qur’an 
that Islam is rahmatan lil ‘alamin and not being bounded by ethnicity. 
Nevertheless, the translation of rahmatan lil ’alamin is different in social 
practices of Islamic organizations. NU takes Islam rahmatan lil ‘alamin as 
Islam that is more moderate and acculturation with local culture. 
According to secretary of NU Papua, NU provides understanding about 
moderate Islam, and initiates agenda of dialogue. Opposite with NU, 
Muhammadiyah centers of its attention on assimilation of culture with 
Islamic values. The Muhammadiyah activities lay emphasis on 
elimination of cultural tradition that opposite with Islamic principles. For 
the moment, different with Muhammadiyah and NU, MMP stated that 
Islam should be rahmatan lil Papua. MMP interprets Islam rahmatan lil 
‘alamin as Islam rahmatan lil Papua. It means that Islam will be blessing for 
all universes if Islam can be blessing first for the people of Papua. This 
point of view does not mean that MMP is creating ethnicity based Islam-
ness, but MMP put Islam in its social context, that is Papua people. 
If it is reflected on their political discourse, Islamic organizations 
are inclined to political orientations of maintaining NKRI (Unitary State 
of Republic Indonesia). It can be understood that politics of Islamic 
organizations represent Muslim migrant that is politics of the state. Thus, 
in the field of Islamic organizations as take place in the field of politics, 
Islamic organizations do not question of political status, history, and 
political identity of Papua. As consequence, there is closeness in political 
orientation between Islamic organizations and government officials in 
Papua to keep up political integration of Papua according to government 
perspective. In the field of Islamic organizations, The Muslim migrant 
takes up dominant position because they hold up the legitimate 
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dominant political discourse that that NKRI is ultimate. It is a symbol of 
the Indonesia political identity.  
Generally speaking, political discourse of MMP is upholding 
Papua as land of peace that terminologically is near with political 
orientation of Church and NGOs in Papua. As subsequently, MMP is 
not associated with the matters of political integration or pro-Papua 
freedom, but MMP centers their attention on establishment of justice in 
the context of making Papua as a land of peace. If it is traced further, 
political discourse that Papua as land of peace has set in MMP between 
Indonesia and Papua nationalist positions in the field of politics. The 
national government and military often take account of this middle 
group inside the Papua nationalist.26 If MMP is laid on a broader the field 
of politics, MMP represent the Papua political identity. 
The Indonesia political identity operates symbolically to cover 
the power interest keeping national integration. It is changed into 
symbolic power in the field of Islamic religion and the broader field of 
politics in Papua. Furthermore, it determines objective positions of 
migrant based Islamic organizations and MMP in the field of Islamic 
organizations. The organizations bear this political identity will rest the 
dominant position. Refers to Smith, The Muslim migrant seems to threat 
nationalism as theological construction or political religion.27 Therefore, 
they could not distinguish obviously between nationalism and Islamic 
principles. It can be understood remind that their existence in Papua go 
hand in hand with the spirit of Indonesia nationalism. In the terms of 
Muhammadiyah, it is to taking back Papua in the hold of motherland. 
With such political identity, the Muslim migrant could not be close to the 
native Papua who have their own political identity, i.e. Papua-ness. The 
Muslim migrant is in dominant position, reproduces their political 
identity through social practices in the field of Islamic organizations. The 
Muslim migrant has indirectly preserved and perpetuated social 
construction that Islam is identical with NKRI. Besides that, in the field 
of politics, the existence of Muslim migrant has made stronger 
                                                          
26 Adriana Elisabeth (eds.), Pemetaan Peran, 39. 
27 Anthony D Smith, Nasionalisme: Teori, Ideologi, dan Sejarah, trans: Frans Kowa (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Erlangga, 2003), 180. 
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government position in their domination over the native Papua, so they 
do not support the demand of national dialogue and settlement of 
human rights violence in Papua. Beside the field of Islamic religion, the 
Muslim Papua also dealt with the Papua-Christian in the field of politics 
and religion. The following parts will describe how the Muslim Papua 
contests their identity against the Christian Papua. 
 
Muslim Papua and Christian Papua 
Political identity arena, in this study, consists of the field of 
Islamic organizations and the field of politics and religion. If the field of 
Islamic organizations is distinguished according to religion social 
practices, the field of politics and religion is made out according to, 
religion political practices that relating the Muslim Papua, Muslim 
migrant, and Christian Papua. The religion political practices are actions 
of religion organizations in competition of material and symbolic 
capitals. As note, this field is not a field of contestation about views and 
values of religions as take place in the field of Islamic organizations. 
According to composition of all kind of capital, the Muslim migrant and 
the Muslim Papua inhabit in subordinated position against the Christian 
Papua in this field. The most significant value in this field is symbolic 
capital that is recognition for a religion as culture and identity of the 
native Papua. The Christian organizations have the biggest capital, as 
they are identical with the religion of the native Papua native compared 
with other religions. 
The zending mission and Christian churches have significant roles 
in reproducing knowledge on Papua identity for the reason that the 
church has paved the way for Papua native to come across modernity 
including knowing who they are. Mawene in his book: “When Allah 
touch Papua,” explains that the land of Papua is a Christian land starting 
from interpretation over Ottouw and Geissler’s poem when they set 
their foot in Papua in the first time.28 According to him,29 historical 
                                                          
28 Mawene, Ketika Allah Menjamah Papua (Jayapura: Panitia Perayaan Tingkat Provinsi 
148 tahun Injil Masuk di Tanah Papua, 2003), 54-55. 
29 Ibid. 
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utterances can be interpreted its meaning as formula of conquering 
which mean that all land and people in Papua were declared as belong to 
Allah commencement for that time; and Allah is almighty over Papua 
and the willing should be obeyed. Meanwhile, from formula of votum, 
those utterances mean that it is praying covering both all-spiritual and 
material life of Papua native beginning from that time. 
In addition, the chairman of Baptist Church of Papua, Rev. 
Socrates Sofyan Yoman in his book the Elimination of Melanesia ethnic 
portrays roles of the Christian Churches as follow.30 The first, coming of 
Christian in Papua bring messages of moral, human rights, and problems 
of Papua. The second, there is a racial and discrimination in the national 
level in Indonesia. For example, the church in West Java has been closed 
by local government with the reason no permission from Muslim 
majority but the development of mosques in Papua is widespread and 
Islamic law is put into practice in Aceh. The third, exploring the root of 
Papua problems in history of Papua as victim of colonial, marginalization 
under New Order, special autonomy and division of provinces, and 
elimination of Melanesian race. The shame outlook also is written by 
Agus Alua, a Catholic priest in his book, West Papua: from colonial to 
colonial.31 
The classification of Papua as Christian is a form of politization 
of religion in Papua. The Catholic Churches has different opinion with 
Christian churches. Fr Saul Wanimbo OFM talks about that strategy of 
struggle of Papua native bring into play church’s propaganda in the 
context of searching out the right of self-determination.32 It can be 
traced further from the term of Papua as land of peace and the struggle 
of Papua for independence is blessed by the God. When the religion 
grows to be political interest, it could not do task of freedom because its 
essential roles has been curved.33 More to the point, that identification is 
                                                          
30 Socrates Sofyan Yoman, Orang Papua Bukan Separatis, Makar, dan OPM, (Jayapura: 
Lembaga Rekonsiliasi hak-Hak Asasi Masyarakat Koteka, 2005). 
31 Agus Alua, Papua Barat Dari Pangkuan Ke Pangkuan, Suatu Ikhtisar Kronologis: Seri 
Pendidikan Politik Papua No. 2 (Jayapura: STFT Fajar Timur, 2006). 
32 Arwam, Mark Rumbiak, Ketika Ideologi Sebuah Bangsa Tiba Di Persimpangan Jalan, Solusi 
Damai Jilid 1, (Yogyakarta: Yogyakarta, 2003), 88. 
33 Ibid. 
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rejected by Bishop of Jayapura, Leo Laba Ladjar OFM, for the reason 
that the recognition is only esoteric. In that context, reason of religion is 
not meant as theological construction because the Papua native has 
Melanesia system of belief that is different with Christian. Christian and 
Melanesia identity is put into discourse to bring together all of Papua 
native to hold the Papua freedom movement. 
The religion political practices, signifies identity contestation in 
Papua, can be seen in those phenomena as follow: rejection against 
founding of great mosque in Manokwari by Christian Papua in 2005, 
proposing the draft of local government regulation on Manokwari as 
holy city in 2007, rejection against establishment of STAIN (State 
Islamic Institute) of Al-Fatah Jayapura in 2007, and rejection against 
founding of mosques in Pegunungan Tengah in 2007. This summary 
only gives explanation the rejection against STAIN where the symbolic 
capital used is tradition. The case is started from buying of land for 
campus building by STAIN to Kaigere tribe. Association of Indonesian 
priest in Jayapura said that the transaction has gone against adat 
regulation because no permission from the great ondoafi (leader of set of 
tribes). Nevertheless, according to vice leader of Adat Council of Papua, 
each of tribe has their own mechanism in transaction of land. To get the 
same position in this contest of power, STAIN Al-Fatah inquired Thaha 
M. Alhamid, the founder of SMP/MMP, to cope this problem. Thaha 
get by this problem by saying to Governor of Papua that STAIN will be 
used for empowerment of the native Papua, so Papua could be land of 
peace in the future because all has been educated in Papua system. The 
interest behind the Papua-Christian may be to maintain domination over 
Muslim, but the interest behind Thaha might be also strengthening the 
existence of Islam in Papua. In that contest of identity, Papua-Muslim 
gets inflation of capital since the governor accepted the establishment 
the institute. 
Based on those political practices of religion organizations, it can 
be found out religion habitus that determine those political actions. For 
example, development of STAIN Al-Fatah is a political practice by the 
Muslim migrant that being influenced by religion habitus i.e. developing 
of Islamic missionary and the field of politics and religion that places the 
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Muslim migrant is in subordinated position. The rejection against Great 
Mosque and STAIN AL-Fatah point out a religion habitus of the 
Christian Papua that less moderate and the field of politics and religion 
that put them in dominant position. The power struggle in the field of 
politics and religion also is undertaken through construction of discourse 
by religion organizations that represent their religion identity. The 
Christian Papua, that is on the dominant position in this field, said that 
Christian is the legitimate religion and culture of Papua native. It has 
been doxa in Papua. Meanwhile, according to them, Islam is for religion 
of migrants or Indonesian-Malay. The Muslim migrant only develops 
discourses that their presence in Papua is needed for the interest of 
development. Islam as religion of the native Papua, constructed by the 
Muslim Papua is heterodoxy. Therefore, that, the dominant identity in 
the field of politics and religion in Papua, is the Christian Papua. It has 
been internalized through discourses, so it has created religion’s habitus 
of the Christian Papua. Furthermore, it has been objectified through 
representations in religion, social, and political practices, for the common 
in everyday life. 
If it is traced further, both the Muslim Papua and the Christian 
Papua have the shame habitus before Papua integration into Indonesia 
that is family religion. Nevertheless, the end of New Order, it looks like 
change of habitus Christian Papua from moderate into fewer moderates 
and from open into relatively closed. They use traditions and culture as 
capital symbolic to prevent development of the Muslim migrant in 
Papua. In identity contestation, the Muslim migrant do not have 
significant role because they are not part of the native Papua. It is 
different with the Christian migrant that can collaborate with Christian 
Papua to keep up Christian domination over Muslim in Papua. In cases 
of STAIN Al-Fatah, the conflict started between the Christian migrant, 
represented by Indonesia Priest Association (Asosiasi Pendeta Indonesia), 
and the Muslim migrant, represented by Islamic Private Foundation 
(Yayasan Wiraswasta Islam). It could not develop into violence conflict 
because the Muslim Papua and the Christian Papua can negotiate and 
prevent such conflict. The negotiation is possible because both of them 
come from the same culture and religion habitus, i.e. the culture of 
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family religion. After identifying the identity contestation in the field of 
politics and religion, I arrive into conclusion in the next part. 
 
Conclusion 
















Source: interview data (processed) 
 = contestation,   = coalition 
Picture 1 
The Configuration of Social Agents and Identity Politics Arena in Papua 
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Based on above description, it can be concluded as follow. The 
first, the Muslim Papua, which is in subordinated position, attempts to 
get recognition of its cultural identity that fluid in the middle of special 
autonomy in Papua. The second, the Muslim Papua that in subordinated 
position in the field of Islamic organizations contest its cultural identity 
to the Muslim migrant by construction of Papua political identity 
represented in the discourse of Islam as rahmatan lil Papua (Papua as land 
of peace), and also practices of human right struggle for the native 
Papua. The third, the Muslim Papua that in subordinated position in the 
field of politics and religion, contest its cultural identity with the 
Christian Papua by construction Islam is the religion of the native Papua 
and practices of conflict’s mediation between the Muslim and the 
Christian Papua, which related with the development of mosques and 
Islamic schools. The strategy of Muslim Papua in struggle for 
recognition of its cultural identity is undertaken by formulation of its 
identity fluidly and acculturation between Papua-ness and Islam-ness in 
the field of identity politics in Papua, and also by internal consolidation 
through establishment of Papua Muslim Assembly (MMP). 
Refer Collin, relation between the Muslim Papua and the 
Christian Papua is outsider with position and insider within relation.34 
They live together and share with the same history, but the Muslim 
Papua thinks that they have a different identity and position with the 
Christian Papua. Refers to Simmel conception on the stranger, the 
Muslim Papua can be said as the stranger in both Muslim and Christian 
community.35 The Muslim migrant do not like the political orientation of 
the Muslim Papua that be closer to the Christian Papua concerning with 
the issue of human right violence. Nevertheless, the Muslim migrant 
needs the existence of Muslim Papua to negotiate and relate the Muslim 
community with the Christian Papua in social issues such as the 
establishing of mosques and Islamic schools.  
                                                          
34 Collins, Patricia Hill, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment (New York: Routledge, 2000), 10. 
35 Simmel, Georg, “On Individuality and Social Forms”, ed. Donald. N. Lavine 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
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Refers to Bourdieu, the association of Papua to Christian is the 
dominant cultural identity in the field of politics and religion, as 
Indonesia-ness is the dominant political identity in the field of Islamic 
organizations. Both of them are resulted from the symbolic and power 
struggle between religious institutions. Both of the field of Islamic 
organizations and the field of politics and religion in Papua is laid down 
inside broader the field of politics that being occupied by the Indonesia 
and Papua nationalist. If the field of Islamic organizations in Papua 
stands in structural homology with the field of politics, so the field on 
politics and religion is different. It is due to the religion as basis on that 
field is not equal with the political contestation between Indonesia and 
Papua nationalist. Nevertheless, the field of economy and the field of 
politics, according to Bishop of Jayapura and secretary general of PDP, 
influences the field of politics identity. As evidence, the resistances of the 
Christian Papua against Muslim migrant in the field of politics and 
religion is carried out to respond experiences of injustices in economic 
and political field the native Papua is in subordinated position. The 
identity politics arena and social agents in this study can be seen in 
picture below to enable of description. It is noted that the picture does 
not represent all of the complexity of social reality, but only take 
description on Muslim Papua, Muslim migrant, Christian Papua, and 
Christian migrant. 
According to Bourdieu, social actors construct identity as 
performative discourse that is developing into domination instrument 
over the subordinated groups or resistance instrument to the dominant 
group. Both of the construction of identity is put into practice in 
objective power relation among social groups. The construction is social 
process covering socialization, internalization, objectifications, and 
inculcation continually. That social process is carried out by social 
practices, socialization in family and community, ritual religion practices, 
or discourse construction. If social boundaries are socially constructed, 
so cultural identity become fluid. This opinion is accordance with Stuart 
Hall that cultural identity is not essence but a matter of searching of 
position. As its implication, cultural identity contains of identity politics 
that is a politics of searching for position in certain society. Cultural 
identity as representation is not permanent because it is incomplete 
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social construction but always in changes process. Compared with 
Geertz and Barth, Bourdieu concepts in analyzing of Papua is more 
relevant because Papua identity is not a matter of primordial attachment 
and Papua identity is not cultural identity but more a political identity. 
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